Joseph Francois,
"External Bindings and the Credibility of Reform"
, in in A. Galal and B. Hoekman, eds., Regional Partners in Global Markets, CEPR, 1996
Original Titel:
External Bindings and the Credibility of Reform
Sprache des Titels:
Englisch
Original Kurzfassung:
This paper examines enhancement of the credibility of economic
policy reform through external trade and investment agreements.
At one level, the role of NAFTA in anchoring recent reforms in
Mexico is discussed. This is followed by more abstract treatment
of how external policy bindings, through bilateral and/or
multilateral agreements, may lend benefits related to the
durability of reforms. In addition to helping secure the path of
reform, such credibility signals may also have important effects
related to assessments by international capital markets of reforms
undertaken in the context of trade and investment agreements.
Sprache der Kurzfassung:
Englisch
Journal:
in A. Galal and B. Hoekman, eds., Regional Partners in Global Markets
Forschungs-