"Flatmates: Other-regarding preferences in an Externality"
Flatmates: Other-regarding preferences in an Externality
Sprache des Titels:
In the first part of this study we analyze equilibria and social optima in an externality
game with (purely) altruistic agents. Altruistic equilibria will be less socially
inefficient than selfish equilibria, yet, less efficient than the social optimum.
In the second part altruism is compared to other formalizations of the “concern
for others”, which are often considered to belong to the “altruism literature.” We will
show that these approaches can be formally very different and even hardly compatible.
To highlight some of these formal differences, we apply a formalization of inequality
aversion and a formalization of reciprocity to the externality game of Part I. Where
possible, we pursue this exercise up to finding the reaction functions of the game.